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COLLEEN CONWAY COONEY, J.: 
Plaintiff-appellant Charles Murray, administrator of the 
estate of Sam Sheppard ("estate"), appeals from the jury's verdict 
denying the estate's claim for relief. We find no merit to the 
appeal and affirm. 
On December 21, 1954, Dr. Samuel Sheppard was convicted of the 
murder of his wife, Marilyn Sheppard, and was sentenced to life in 
prison. After being incarcerated for ten years, his conviction was 
reversed and he was granted a new trial by the United States 
Supreme Court on the basis that he had been denied a fair trial. 
Sheppard v. Maxwell (1966), 384 U.S. 333. Upon retrial, Sheppard 
was found not guilty. He was discharged from prison in 1966 and 
died on April 6, 1970. 
On October 19, 1995, twenty-five years after Sheppard's death 
and almost thirty years after his acquittal, Alan Davis, special 
administrator of Sheppard's estate, 1 filed a "Petition for 
Declaration of Innocence as a Wrongfully Imprisoned Individual" in 
the original criminal case in common pleas court. This petition 
1Alan Davis died in September 1999, and Charles Murray, the new 
administrator, was substituted as a party by the estate on February 
12, 2000. 
-
-
-
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sought to determine that, pursuant to R.C. 2305.02, Sheppard was 
innocent and had been wrongfully imprisoned. 
Davis subsequently filed a second petition for declaration of 
innocence on July 24, 1996 in the civil division of the common 
pleas court, after it was determined the action was a civil matter. 
On August 8, 1996, the State moved to dismiss the case, 
alleging that the petition failed to state a claim upon which 
relief could be granted. Specifically, the State alleged that the 
petition was barred due to laches, that the statute of limitations 
had expired, and that the estate's administrator lacked standing to 
file suit on Sheppard's behalf. The trial court denied the motion 
to dismiss without opinion. The State filed an answer raising as 
affirmative defenses the same issues it presented in its motion to 
dismiss. 
On May 7, 1997, the State filed a Civ.R. 12(C) motion for 
judgment on the pleadings, again arguing that the statute of 
limitations had expired, that the administrator of the estate 
lacked standing under the wrongful imprisonment statute, and that 
laches prevented the claim. 
denied the motion. 
On June 3, 1997, the trial court 
On June 8, 1997, the Prosecuting Attorney for Cuyahoga County 
filed a petition for a writ of prohibition with the Ohio Supreme 
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Court, seeking to prohibit the Honorable Ronald Suster and the the 
Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas from conducting further 
proceedings, claiming that the lower court lacked jurisdiction. 
The arguments in the petition were identical to those raised in 
the State's motions before the trial court. 
The Ohio Supreme Court in State ex rel. Tubbs Jones, 
Prosecuting Attorney v. Suster, Judge, et. al. (1998), 84 Ohio 
St.3d 70, denied the writ, finding that the issues raised were not 
jurisdictional and, therefore, an adequate remedy existed to raise 
the arguments on direct appeal. 
On September 10, 1999, the State filed a motion for summary 
judgment, again asserting that the statute of limitations had 
expired, that the administrator of the estate lacked standing, and 
that laches prevented the action. The trial court denied the 
summary judgment motion without opinion on January 24, 2000. 
The case then proceeded to a jury trial on February 7, 2000. 
On April 12, 2000, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the 
State. 
The estate now appeals and assigns four assignments of 
error. 
I . THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY GRANTING LEAVE TO 
AMEND ITS ANSWER FOUR YEARS AFTER THE START OF 
-
-
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LITIGATION, HOLDING THAT THE STATE OF OHIO HAS 
THE RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL, AND ALLOWING THE 
INSTANT CASE TO BE TRIED BY A JURY. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY REFUSING TO ADMIT 
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT'S PROFFERED EXPERT 
PSYCHIATRIC TESTIMONY REGARDING THE PROPENSITY 
AND LIKELIHOOD OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT'S 
DECEDENT TO COMMIT A CRIME, WHILE ALLOWING 
DEFENDANT-APPELLEE TO INTRODUCE EXPERT "CRIME 
SCENE ANALYSIS" TESTIMONY BASED ON THE SAME 
INFERENCES. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY ALLOWING DEFENDANT-
APPELLEE TO READ TRANSCRIBED TESTIMONY TO THE 
JURY FROM THE CRIMINAL TRIAL IN WHICH 
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT'S DECEDENT WAS CONVICTED, 
ALTHOUGH THE TRIAL WAS REPEATEDLY DECLARED TO 
BE CONTAMINATED, AND CONDUCTED IN VIOLATION OF 
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT'S 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS. 
DECEDENT'S 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY EXCLUDING EVIDENCE 
TENDING TO SHOW THAT A THIRD PARTY. COMMITTED 
THE CRIME FOR WHICH PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT'S 
DECEDENT WAS CONVICTED, WHILE ALLOWING 
DEFENDANT-APPELLEE TO INTRODUCE PREJUDICIAL 
CHARACTER EVIDENCE OF THE DECEDENT. 
We first address the State's motion to dismiss the appeal. 
The State argues that the estate's notice of appeal was untimely 
because the trial court dismissed the case with prejudice on May 
30, 2000, and the estate did not file its notice of appeal until 
July 28, 2000. 
The trial court issued the following entry on May 30, 2000: 
JE dated 4/20/00 is a final entry. 
Remove case from active docket. 
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On this entry, the trial court marked the box "dismissed with 
prejudice." The record does not support a basis for the court's 
marking the box "dismissed with prejudice." There is no evidence 
that the parties entered into a settlement agreement after the jury 
verdict and Civ.R. 4l(A) (2) and (B) does not provide a basis for 
the court's sua sponte dismissing a case with prejudice after a 
jury verdict has been entered. Furthermore, it appears that the 
trial court did not intend the journal entry to have the effect of 
a dismissal with prejudice because it proceeded to rule on the 
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict on July 3, 2000, 
after entering the May 30, 2000 journal entry. 
We, therefore, find the estate's appeal from the date of the 
trial court's denial of the motion for judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict was timely filed. 
Although we find no merit to the State's motion to dismiss the 
appeal, we nonetheless find that we need not address the estate's 
assignments of error because we find that the statute of 
limitations has expired on the estate's claim and that the claim 
for "wrongful imprisonment" abates upon the death of the individual 
who was allegedly wrongfully imprisoned. 2 
2The State raised these arguments in its response brief without 
(continued ... ) 
-
-
-
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R.C. 2305.07 states as follows: 
Except as 
[126.30.01] 
provided in sections 126.301 
and 1302.98 of the Revised Code, 
an action upon a contract not in writing, 
express or implied, or upon a liability 
created by statute other than a forfeiture or 
penalty, shall be brought within six years 
after the cause of action thereof accrued. 
(Emphasis added) . 
R.C. 2743.48 was enacted to provide compensation to innocent 
persons who have been wrongfully convicted and incarcerated for a 
felony. Walden v. State (1989), 47 Ohio St.3d 47, 53. Without the 
enactment of R.C. 2743.48, the State would remain immune from such 
lawsuits. Id. It is, therefore, a claim derived from the 
enactment of a statute. Consequently, pursuant to R.C. 2305.07, 
the statute of limitations for filing a claim for wrongful 
imprisonment is six years. 3 
To find that the statute of limitations could extend as long 
as thirty years after the person has been acquitted leads to 
( ... continued) 
filing a cross appeal. However, pursuant to App.R. 3(C) (2) a cross 
appeal is not necessary when the arguments raised do not seek to 
change the judgment but merely raise alternative grounds in support 
of the judgment that were either ignored or overlooked by the trial 
court. Kaplysh v. Takieddine, et al. (1988), 35 Ohio St.3d 170, 
175. 
3 Interestingly, the statute of limitations for a common law 
cause of action for false imprisonment is one year pursuant to R.C. 
2305.ll(A). 
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evidentiary problems. Many of the witnesses have died and the 
surviving witnesses' memories have faded. The ability to glean the 
physical evidence from long ago in a prior proceeding is also a 
daunting task. Therefore, based on public policy alone, it could 
not have been the intent of the legislature to permit such a cause 
of action to be brought without any time limitation whatsoever. 
We also find that the claim for wrongful imprisonment abates 
upon the death of the individual allegedly wrongfully imprisoned. 
R.C. 2305.21 governs the survival of causes of actions and 
provides: 
In addition to the causes of action which 
survive at common law, causes of action for 
mesne profits, or injuries to the person or 
property, or for deceit or fraud, also shall 
survive; and such actions may be brought 
notwithstanding the death of the person 
entitled or liable thereto. 
As we stated above, the right to sue the State for wrongful 
imprisonment was created by R.C. 2743.48. Walden v. State, supra. 
Before the creation of this statute, the State had sovereign 
immunity against such suits. Id. No right existed in common law in 
which a wrongfully imprisoned person could pursue an action against 
the State. Bennett v. Ohio Department of Reha.bi.Ii ta ti on and 
Correction (1991), 60 Ohio St.3d 107, 110; Wright v. State (1990), 
-
-
-
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69 Ohio App.3d 775, 779. Therefore, the estate's claim does not 
survive under the R.C. 2305.21 exception for claims that existed at 
common law. 
The claim also does not qualify as "injuries to the person" 
under R.C. 2305.21. Ohio law has held that "injuries to the 
person" means physical injuries. Witcher v. Fairlawn (1996), 113 
Ohio App.3d 214, 217; Oakwood v. Makar (1983), 11 Ohio App.3d 46, 
47. The injury caused by being wrongfully imprisoned is a 
violation of one's personal rights, not a physical injury. See, 
Witcher, supra. (Torts such as false imprisonment and malicious 
prosecution do not survive because they are violations of personal 
rights, not physical injuries). 
Further, R.C. 2743.48 states in relevant part: 
(A) As used in this section, a "wrongfully 
imprisoned individual" means an individual who 
satisfies each of the following: 
( 1) He was charged with a violation of a 
section of the Revised Code by an indictment 
or information prior to, 
September 24, 1986, and the 
was an aggravated felony or 
or on or after, 
violation charged 
felony. 
(2) He was found guilty of, but did not plead 
guilty to, the particular charge or a 
lesser-included offense by the court or jury 
involved, and the offense of which he was 
found guilty was an aggravated felony or 
felony. 
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(3) He was sentenced to an indefinite or 
definite term of imprisonment in a state 
correctional institution for the offense of 
which he was found guilty. 
( 4) ·rhe individual's conviction was *** 
reversed on appeal ***· 
(5) Subsequent to his sentencing and during or 
subsequent to his imprisonment, it was 
determined by a court of common pleas that the 
offense of which he was found guilty, 
including all lesser-included offenses, either 
was not committed by him or was not committed 
by any person. 
This statute clearly only refers to the individual who was 
actually imprisoned. As the court held in Wright, supra at 781, 
"It is not the judiciary's function to rewrite laws according to 
what the court perceives as just but to enforce the literal writing 
of the statute whenever possible. Bd. of Edn. v. Fulton Cty. 
Budget Comm. (1975), 41 Ohio St.2d 147. Regardless of the method 
of interpretation used, absent ambiguity, a court will not delve 
into the legislative intent but will give effect to the plain 
meaning of the statute * * *. 11 The administrator of the estate 
cannot meet any of the requirements of the "individual 11 as set 
forth in R.C. 2743.48(A) (1) through (4). 
Because the statute of limitations expired on the estate's 
claim and because the claim abated upon the death of Samuel H. 
-
-
-
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Sheppard, we find that the State's motion to dismiss should have 
been granted. 
Since we find the matter should not have proceeded to trial, 
the assignments of error raised by the estate are moot and need not 
be addressed. App.R. 12(A) (1) (c) 
Judgment affirmed. 
·-,- : ~-.r 
. i 
•. ·-\ 'I .-~-,-· .': <. -
. l .1·,;;: 
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It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant its costs 
herein taxed. 
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for.this appeal. 
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court 
directing the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas to carry this 
judgment into execution. 
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate 
pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
PATRICIA ANN BLACKMQN, P.J. and 
JAMES J. SWEENEY_._ J. CONCUR 
COLLEEN CONWAY COONEY 
ANNOUNCEMENT OF DECISION 
PER APP. R. 22(8), 22(0) AND 26(A) 
RECeIVED 
FEB 2 l 2002 
GERAL.O E. F'UEAST 
CLERK OF THE COURT OF .1.PPEALS 
BY ---··. ~-Dl!P. 
N.B. This entry is an announcement of the court's decision. See App.R. 
22(B), 22(D) and 26(A); Loc.App.R. 22. This decision will be journalized 
and will become the judgment and order of the court pursuant to App.R. 
22 (E) ·unless a motion for reconsideration with supporting brief, per 
App.R. 26(A), is filed within ten (10) days of the announcement of the 
court's decision. The time period for review by the Supreme Co-qrt of 
Ohio shall begin to run upon the journalization of this court 1 s 
announcement of decision by the clerk per App.R. 22 (E). See, also, 
S.Ct.Prac.R. II, Section 2(A) (1). 
-
